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Homicide by Vehicle In Pennsylvania:




While the current Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code contains
many changes from the previous code, none of the changes has
caused more controversy than the section dealing with homicide by
vehicle.' Soon after the effective date of the vehicle code, county
courts began to struggle with the meaning2 and constitutionality
3 of
the section. This article will review the history of the section and
analyze the meaning and constitutionality of its provisions.
II. History
The previous motor vehicle code did not contain an offense sim-
ilar to homicide by vehicle. Instead, a prosecutor had to rely upon
the charge of involuntary manslaughter in the Crimes Code4 for con-
* B.A. Moravian College, 1966; J.D. Dickinson School of Law, 1969; Partner, Mancke
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1. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977).
The impetus for the new vehicle code came from the federal government through the
Highway Safety Act. 23 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Supp. 1978). The court in Commonwealth v.
Barone, 104 Montg. 341 (Pa. C.P. 1978) stated that "the primary purpose of the proposed
Motor Vehicle Code is to bring the traffic rules of the Commonwealth into compliance with
the requirements of the Federal Highway Safety Act, and the standards principally, the uni-
form standards for state highway safety programs." Id at 342. See generally Kearney, Penn-
sylvania's Obsolete Traffic Laws, PA. B.A.Q., June 1973, at 561.
2. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Serucsak, 101 Dauph. Rep. 50 (Pa. C.P. 1979); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 66 Del. L. Rep. 570 (Pa. C.P. 1979); Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 44 North-
ampton Rep. 42 (Pa. C.P. 1979), affd - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 423 A.2d 381 (1980).
3. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beams, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 616 (C.P. Adams County
1978); Commonwealth v. Kishbaugh, II Pa. D. & C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979); Com-
monwealth v. Stahl, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 87 (C.P. Lycoming County 1979); Commonwealth v.
Sloat, 92 York L. Rep. 180 (Pa. C.P. 1979); Commonwealth v. Burt, No. 449-1978 (C.P. War-
ren County March 19, 1979), rev'd, - Pa. - 415 A.2d 89 (1980).
4. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (Purdon 1973). Section 2504 of the Crimes Code
defines involuntary manslaughter as follows:
A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of
an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act
in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.
viction in cases concerning violations of the Vehicle Code or traffic
ordinances that resulted in death.
In order to obtain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter,
the law requires a showing of reckless conduct, gross negligence, or
circumstances indicating a disregard for human life and an indiffer-
ence to the consequences.' The mere violation of a motor vehicle
code provision has not always been sufficient to support a finding of
guilt of involuntary manslaughter.6 The Superior Court has held
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for involun-
tary manslaughter in cases in which the driver was speeding,7 driving
on the berm of the road,8 passing on the wrong side of the road,9
failing to yield at a stop sign,' 0 or encroaching upon the opposite
lane. "
As an apparent response to the inapplicability of the involun-
tary manslaughter charge to many motor vehicle accidents resulting
in death, the legislature enacted the section dealing with homicide by
vehicle. 12 The section provides that
[any person who unintentionally causes the death of another per-
son while engaged in the violation of any law of this Common-
wealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of
a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic is guilty of homicide by
vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is
the cause of death.1
3
The homicide by vehicle section has its origin in the Uniform
Vehicle Code,' 4 which provides the following:
Whoever shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of
another person while engaged in the violation of any state law or
5. Commonwealth v. Agnew, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 398 A.2d 209 (1979); Commonwealth
v. Trainor, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 381 A.2d 944 (1977).
6. Commonwealth v. Agnew, - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 398 A.2d 209 (1979). In Agnew, the
Superior Court held that even though defendant was guilty of failing to yield one half of the
highway and of operating a vehicle that exceeded the maximum width allowed by law, he was
not guilty of involuntary manslaughter when the driver of an approaching vehicle collided
with defendant's vehicle and was killed.
7. Commonwealth v. Sisca, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 125, 369 A.2d 325 (1976).
8. Commonwealth v. Gochenaur, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 588, 341 A.2d 163 (1975).
9. Commonwealth v. Greer, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 448, 335 A.2d 770 (1975).
10. Commonwealth v. Clowser, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 208, 239 A.2d 870 (1968).
11. Commonwealth v. Agnew, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 398 A.2d 209 (1979); Commonwealth
v. Trainor, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 381 A.2d 944 (1977).
12. See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 381 A.2d 944 (1977).
13. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977).
14. The Uniform Vehicle Code is published by the National Committee on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances. The Committee's 130 members include legislators, police of-
ficers, highway officials and judges. PA. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE VEHICLE CODE
"RULES OF THE ROAD" 3 (1974). The Committee has promoted the adoption of a separate
vehicle code provision concerning vehicular homicide in order to adequately appraise drivers
of the applicability of homicide statutes to them. 5 NAT'L COMM. ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC
LAWS AND ORDINANCES, No. 7, STATE LAWS ON HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE, i, 2, 14 (Oct. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as NAT'L COMM.]. Thirty-four jurisdictions have enacted laws specifically
concerning vehicular homicide. Id at 2. Only sixteen states, however, have included the ve-
hicular homicide provisions in their Vehicle Codes. Id at 1.
municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle
or to the regulation of traffic shall be guilty of homicide when such
violation is the proximate cause of death.15
Significantly, until 1962, the Uniform Vehicle Code described
the crime as "negligent homicide" and the section provided as fol-
lows:
When the death of any person ensues within 1 year as a proximate
result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless
disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such ve-
hicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.'
6
The difference in the two Uniform Vehicle Code versions is
readily apparent. The previous version suggested the need for proof
of a reckless disregard for the safety of others. The current version
requires only a causally connected violation of a vehicular law or
ordinance.' 7 The majority of states that have enacted statutes simi-
lar to the Uniform Vehicle Code have retained the requirement that
there be proof that the defendant acted negligently or recklessly.' 8
The language of the section adopted by Pennsylvania suggests
no requirement that the defendant act negligently or recklessly in
order to be found guilty of the offense of homicide by vehicle. It
15. Uniform Vehicle Code § I I-903a. In 1975, the Pennsylvania Justice Department pre-
pared a report on the proposed revisions to the Vehicle Code. The report indicated that the
Uniform Vehicle Code provisions for homicide by vehicle were being followed. It erroneously
stated, however, that the Pennsylvania provisions were similar to thirty-three other states. PA.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PENNSYLVANIA VEHICLE CODE, REPORT OF PROPOSED REVISION 153
(1975). The applicability of the charge to "any" violation and the lack of any degree of culpa-
bility separates the version adopted in Pennsylvania from most of the other states. See NAT'L
COMM. ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAW AND ORD., TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED § 11-903 (1972).
16. Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-903a (1956 version).
17. By rendering a driver guilty of homicide by vehicle for causing a death as the result
of violating any traffic law, the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances
maintains that inconsistencies in prior cases will be eliminated since factfinders would no
longer determine when the requisite amount of culpability exists. NAT'L COMM., supra note
14, at 14.
18. See generally NAT'L COMM. ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAW AND ORD., TRAFFIC LAWS
ANNOTATED § 11-903 (1972); 74 AM. JUR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 340-44
(1980); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 3d 473 (1968). In North Carolina, the Uniform Vehicle Code provi-
sions were followed and the appellate courts have interpreted the law as requiring no proof of
culpability or intent. See State v. Freeman, 31 N.C. App. 93, 228 S.E.2d 516 (1976), in which
the court stated the following:
Indictment for the common law crime of manslaughter has proved ineffective as a
means of repressing the negligence in motor vehicle operation causing death upon
the public thoroughfares. The motorist is generally a reputable citizen, and the
wrong committed by him which brings someone to his death is most often an unin-
tentional violation of a prohibitory statute or ordinance, unaccompanied by reckless-
ness or possible consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of
reasonable provision. Thus, it is apparent that the intention of the legislature in en-
acting G.S. 20-141.4 was to define a crime of lesser degree of manslaughter wherein
criminal responsibility for death by vehicle is not dependent upon the presence of
culpable or criminal negligence.
Id at 98, 228 S.E.2d at 519.
In Ohio, the legislature repealed its statute after the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v.
Kotapish, 171 Ohio St. 349, 171 N.E.2d 505 (1960), interpreted the law to require no culpabil-
ity. The current Ohio statute requires proof of recklessness or negligence. OHIO REV. CODE
§§ 2903.06, 2903.07 (Baldwin 1972).
stands to reason that if no requirement of recklessness exists, then
the penalty for homicide by vehicle should be less than that required
by involuntary manslaughter, which deals with reckless or wanton
conduct. In prescribing the penalties for each type of conduct, how-
ever, the legislature made no distinction and the penalties are identi-
cal. 9 A further anomaly exists since a conviction for homicide by
vehicle results in a revocation of a driver's license for one year20
while a conviction for involuntary manslaughter results in no revo-
cation.
The Pennsylvania legislature never debated the homicide by ve-
hicle provision now contained in the current vehicle code.2' The
lack of debate on this significant change from prior law is most un-
fortunate. The intent of the legislature has been left for the courts'
interpretation.
III. Constitutional Issues
The early court decisions dealing with the meaning and consti-
tutionality of the section often considered only limited aspects of the
issues involved.22 Other constitutional arguments were deemed
waived or never mentioned by the courts.23 Even though the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has now considered the meaning and con-
stitutionality of this section on two occasions, 24 confusion and
unanswered questions still exist. After each of the constitutional is-
sues is understood, the difficulty of interpreting and applying this
section becomes evident.
.4. Vagueness
Immediately after the enactment of the current Vehicle Code,
19. A misdemeanor of the first degree is punishable by a prison sentence of up to five
years and/or a fine up to $5,000. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101, 1104 (Purdon 1973).
20. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1532 (Purdon 1977). To date, no court has discussed
this issue in its consideration of the meaning or constitutionality of homicide by vehicle. The
absence of any provisions for suspension or revocation of a defendant's operating privileges
provides some support for the theory that involuntary manslaughter has no applicability to
cases concerning violations of the Vehicle Code.
21. The Pennsylvania Justice Department initiated a Vehicle Code Project in 1973. In
1975, after two years of study, the Department promulgated a Report of Proposed Revision,
which included a homicide by vehicle section. PA. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE VEHI-
CLE CODE "RULES OF THE ROAD" 7-8 (1974). The proposed section was adopted by the legis-
lature without change in 1976. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977). The homicide
by vehicle statute became effective July 1, 1977. Id
22. E.g., Commonwealth v. Burt, - Pa. _ 415 A.2d 89 (1980). The first appellate court
decision concerning the homicide by vehicle statute failed to address the constitutional issues
raised. Commonwealth v. Danchision, Pa. Super. Ct. _ 410 A.2d 1274 (1979).
23. E.g., Commonwealth v. Burt, Pa. ._, 415 A.2d 89 (1980). In the second appellate
court decision concerning the statute, the primary constitutional issue was deemed by two
judges to be waived since it had not been properly preserved. Commonwealth v. Barone, -
Pa. Super. Ct. - 419 A.2d 457 (1980).
24. See Commonwealth v. Field, - Pa. _ 417 A.2d 160(1980); Commonwealth v. Burt,
Pa. , 415 A.2d 28 (1980).
county courts began to consider the meaning of the homicide by ve-
hicle provision. A review of those decisions indicates a wide variety
of interpretations. The majority of the lower courts ruled that the
legislature intended to impose strict liability without regard to culpa-
bility.25 The Dauphin County Court suggested that the legislature
intended to punish only conduct that constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care.26 The Adams County Court took a differ-
ent position and held that the legislature intended "mere negligence"
to be the basis of criminal responsibility.27 Another lower court sim-
ply concluded that the statute was too vague to interpret.28 The
county courts were obviously in need of appellate court guidance on
the issue.
The Superior Court struggled inconclusively with the meaning
of the statute. In Commonwealth v. Barone,29 two judges held that
this section required proof that a defendant's actions amounted to a
deviation from the standard of care" before a conviction could be
upheld. Two judges regarded the issue of legislative intent as ex-
ceedingly close, but opted for the position that the legislature in-
tended to impose strict criminal liability rendering the section
unconstitutional.3" The remaining judges concluded that the legisla-
ture clearly intended to impose strict liability and that this was con-
25. See Commonwealth v. Koch, 67 Lanc. L. Rep. 145 (Pa. C.P. 1980); Commonwealth
v. Kishbaugh, II Pa. D. & C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979); Commonwealth v. Stahl, 12
Pa. D. & C.3d 87 (C.P. Lycoming County 1979); Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 44 Northampton
Rep. 42 (Pa. C.P. 1979), a'd, - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 423 A.2d 381 (1980).
26. Commonwealth v. Serucsak, 101 Dauph. Rep. 50 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
27. Commonwealth v. Beams, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 616 (C.P. Adams County 1978).
28. Commonwealth v. Burt, No. 449-1978 (Pa. C.P., Warren County March 19, 1979),
rev'd, - Pa. -, 415 A.2d 89 (1980).
29. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 419 A.2d 457 (1980). The trial court in Commonwealth P.
Barone, 104 Montg. 341 (Pa. C.P. 1978) interpreted the homicide by vehicle statute as requir-
ing reckless conduct. The court simply read the involuntary manslaughter standards into the
new statute and asserted that a legislative intent to require reckless behavior could be implied
for two reasons. First, since the majority of other states require reckless conduct and the pur-
pose of the new Vehicle Code was to promote uniformity among the states, the legislature must
have contemplated the requirement of reckless behavior. Second, since the homicide by vehi-
cle statute and the involuntary manslaughter statute require the same penalty, "[slome degree
of culpability must have been contemplated in the legislative plan to provide similar penal-
ties." Id at 344.
Another authority for the "recklessness theory" is the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, which
provides that "[w]hen the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is
not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly with respect thereto." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(c) (Purdon 1973).
30. - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 419 A.2d 457, 478 (1980) (Spaeth, J., concurring). In his concur-
ring opinion, Judge Spaeth noted that the charge of careless driving was debated and removed
from the proposed new Vehicle Code. The comments during the debate are of some interest in
determining whether the legislature intended to create strict criminal liability or to impose
criminal culpability on the basis of ordinary negligence in any section of the Code. The legis-
lative comments included the following:
Representative Eckensberger: ...It shocks my conscience that we should say
that it henceforth will be a crime if you drive carelessly. Now that amounts to ordi-
nary negligence. ...
PA. LEGIS. J., HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 4072 (1976).
stitutionally permissible.3 As a result, this decision was of little
assistance in resolving the intent of the legislature.32 Further clarifi-
cation was needed from the Supreme Court.
In Commonwealth v. Burt, 33 the Warren County Court held that
section 3732 of the Vehicle Code was unconstitutionally vague. The
Commonwealth appealed the decision providing the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court its first opportunity to discuss the meaning of the
statute. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling and
stated that ". . . section 3732 defines 'homicide by vehicle' as a
death caused by any person's conduct violating law or municipal or-
dinance applying to vehicles or traffic regulations. ' 34 The court held
that the section required proof of nothing more than a traffic viola-
tion causing death. Unfortunately, the court discussed neither the
constitutionality of such an interpretation nor the degree of causa-
tion necessary for a conviction.
B. Imposition of Strict Criminal Liability
Although the Supreme Court declared that the section was not
unconstitutionally vague, the decision did not address the issue of
whether a strict liability statute requiring no mens rea or culpability
is constitutional in Pennsylvania.35
In Commonwealth v. Barone, 36 Judge Spaeth stated that to im-
pose strict liability without culpability would violate due process
since a conviction would "gravely [besmirch] the defendant's reputa-
tion and because the punishment is too severe."37 Judge Spaeth con-
cluded that the imposition of a strict liability crime constitutes a
violation of due process under our State constitution and very well
Representative Manderino . . . I see no reason to introduce into the statutes of
Pennsylvania a new concept in the violation of the Motor Vehicle Code wherein
ordinary negligence, carelessness, can be the reason for a citation ...
Id at 4160.
Representative Scirisa: . . . I cannot think of any other area in the law where
ordinary negligence carries with it a criminal penalty. We should leave this a civil
matter ...
Id at 4161.
31. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 419 A.2d 457, 487 (Wieand, J., dissenting).
32. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 102 Dauph. Rep. 109 (Pa. C.P. 1980); Common-
wealth v. Koch, 67 Lane. L. Rep. 145 (Pa. C.P. 1980).
33. - Pa. _ 415 A.2d 89 (1980).
34. Id at - 415 A.2d at 92. The Superior Court has recently held that a private corpo-
ration may be held criminally liable for homicide by vehicle. Commonwelth v. Mcllwain
School Bus Lines, Inc., - Pa. Super. Ct. - 423 A.2d 413 (1980).
35. Similar laws in other states have been held to be constitutional. See, e.g., State v.
Edwards, 236 Ga. 104, 222 S.E.2d 385 (1976); People v. Garman, 411 Il. 279, 103 N.E.2d 636
(1952); State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075 (1959). In Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F.
Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), the court stated that "[t]here are academic and theoretical difficul-
ties not of constitutional proportions with making less than reckless conduct punishable." Id
at 938.
36. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 419 A.2d 457 (1980).
37. Id at .__, 419 A.2d at 484 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
may constitute a violation of federal due process.38
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Field 
39
rejected this due process argument. The Supreme Court, in finding
the statute constitutional, stated the following:
[Slection 3732 requires the Commonwealth to prove that appellee
has deviated from the standard of care established by section
3703, the underlying Vehicle Code provision allegedly violated
here. . . . Consistent with the culpability requirement, section
3703 leaves for determination at trial whether appellee knew, or
should have known, he engaged in the conduct claimed to be in
violation of that section. Thus, for example, it remains to be de-
cided if a reasonable driver could, in view of the congestion of the
terminal exit, know where the sidewalk was or, indeed, if a side-
walk existed.4°
This language suggests that only death resulting from culpable
conduct will be punishable by this section. The concurring opinion
of Judge Flaherty noted that the court had "construed the Code to
. . . require culpable conduct, i.e., a mens rea, as a requisite for con-
viction."'4  This construction seems to nullify the court's initial proc-
lamation that this section deals with "death caused by any person's
conduct violating law or municipal [regulations]. '' 42 Since our courts
have long held that a lack of mens rea or culpability is no defense to
many traffic offenses,43 the Supreme Court must be requiring proof
38. Id at _ 419 A.2d at 482. (Speath, J., concurring). See United States v. Heller, 579
F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1978); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959).
39. - Pa. _ 417 A.2d 160 (1980).
40. 1d at._.417 A.2d at 163. In Field, the lower court declared the homicide by vehicle
section unconstitutional and the Commonwealth appealed. The facts of the case are signifi-
cant. The victim was a television cameraman who was assigned to film picketing at an ARCO
terminal. Police asked the victim to move to a sidewalk to do his filming. As six ARCO
vehicles began to leave, picketers illegally crowded the terminal exit. Defendant Richard Field
was operating the last of the six vehicles, none of which were moving at an excessive speed.
Police had to push back the crowd to permit the vehicles to leave the terminal. The camera-
man continued to film the activity on the sidewalk near the curb. As the defendant's vehicle
proceeded through the exit, the side of the trailer struck the victim throwing him to the side-
walk. He was fatally injured when the rear wheels ran over him.
Defendant was arrested and charged with driving on the sidewalk, 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3703 (Purdon 1977); reckless driving, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3714 (Purdon 1977);
and homicide by vehicle, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977). After a coroner's
hearing, the reckless driving charge was dismissed but the other charges were upheld at the
hearing. The lower court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the information based on
homicide by vehicle. Commonwealth v. Field, No. CC7906073A (Pa. C.P., Allegheny County
Feb. 12, 1980), revd, - Pa. _ 417 A.2d 160 (1980). The majority opinion of the Supreme
Court in Field initially suggested that the mere violation of the vehicle code provides the cul-
pable conduct necessary to convict. Absolute liability seems to have been imposed. The refer-
ence to whether the defendant knew or should have known he was violating the Vehicle Code,
however, indicates a requirement of knowledge or negligence on the part of the defendant.
The reference to a reasonable man standard is also indicative of a negligence standard of
culpability. The underlying section allegedly violated, however, contains no requirement for
negligence or knowledge and imposes strict liability. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3703 (Purdon
1977). The majority opinion is additionally confusing since it appears to adopt a causation
standard imposed only in cases of absolute liability.
41. Id. at _ 417 A.2d at 164.
42. Commonwealth v. Burt, - Pa. at _ 415 A.2d at 92 (1980).
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Winkler, 10 Centre L.J. 589 (Pa. C.P. 1975) (driving
of more than a violation of a traffic law." The requirement of culpa-
ble conduct does not appear anywhere in the section but was judi-
cially imposed by the Supreme Court to preserve it from
constitutional attack.45 The degree of culpable conduct required for
a conviction, however, was left unresolved.
The degree of culpability is the issue that is central to both the
meaning and constitutionality of the section. Our criminal system
has recognized four degrees of culpable conduct. The Crimes Code
provides that culpability exists only if the defendant acted intention-
ally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.46 In order to convict on
the basis of negligent conduct, however, the defendant's actions must
constitute a gross deviation from the required standard of care47 and
proof of simple or civil negligence has been insufficient for convic-
48tion.
By its terms, section 3732 does not concern intentional conduct.
If the required degree of culpability is a conscious disregard, reck-
lessness, or gross negligence on the part of the defendant, then the
charge becomes identical to involuntary manslaughter 9.4  It is doubt-
under the influence); Commonwealth v. Lipka, 10 Centre L.J. 593 (Pa. C.P. 1975) (speeding);
Commonwealth v. Roth, 60 Lanc. L. Rep. 133 (Pa. C.P. 1966) (driving under the influence);
Commonwealth v. Ulis, 22 Luz. L. Rep. 354 (Pa. C.P. 1922) (lighting violation); Common-
wealth v. Mostowski, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 248 (C.P. Montour County 1959) (overweight viola-
tion); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 37 Somerset L.J. 408 (Pa. C.P. 1979) (speeding violation);
Commonwealth v. Mishler, 2 Somerset L.J. 489 (Pa. C.P. 1925) (lighting violation). See also
Commonwealth v. Koons, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 402, 268 A.2d 202 (1970); Commonwealth v.
Boylan, 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 629, 297 A.2d 831 (1972).
44. A strict reading of the statute, however, mandates liability upon the violation of any
traffic law without proof of recklessness or negligence. See MEYER, PA. VEHICLE CODE ANN.
§ 3732 (1978) (comment). A literal construction of the statute is supported by the Penn-
sylvania statutory construction rules, which provide that "[wihen the words of a statute are
clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit." I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979). Furthermore,
the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances maintains that the grava-
men of the offense is the violation of any traffic law or ordinance. See note 17, supra. This
position is authoritative since the Pennsylvania statutory construction rules provide that
"[s]tatutes uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and construed to effect their
general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them." I PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1927 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
45. In cases under the involuntary manslaughter statute, Pennsylvania courts have held
that not every violation of the law will render a motorist criminally liable for the death of
another. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sisca, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 125, 369 A.2d 325 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Hinds, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 366 A.2d 1252 (1976).
46. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(a) (Purdon 1973). The Crimes Code culpability re-
quirements would be applicable to homicide by vehicle unless the courts rule that the charge
imposes absolute liability. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 107, 305(a)(2) (Purdon 1973). See
also Commonwealth v. Serucsak, 101 Dauph. Rep. 50 (Pa. C.P. 1979); Commonwealth v.
Hartzell, 44 Northampton L.J. 42 (Pa. C.P. 1979), afld, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 423 A.2d 381
(1980).
47. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b)(4) (Purdon 1973).
48. Commonwealth v. Gilliland, - Pa. Super Ct. - 422 A.2d 206 (1980). Common-
wealth v. Trainor, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 381 A.2d 944 (1977).
49. The court in Commonwealth v. Serucsak, 101 Dauph. Rep. 50 (Pa. C.P. 1979), sug-
gested that "[h]omicide by vehicle is a new model of the old involuntary manslaughter as
applied to automobile accidents. ... Id. at 51. "This [degree of culpability] is not all that
different from the old element of involuntary manslaughter - just as the new cars are not all
ful that the legislature intended this section to be identical to invol-
untary manslaughter.5" No reason to enact the new section would
have existed if the result was to be the same.
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the de-
gree of required culpability, the Superior Court discussed the issue
on several occasions.5 Significantly, one of those opinions 52 was
written after the Supreme Court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Field 13
The Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Nay,54 concluded that in
order to convict a defendant of this offense, his actions must consti-
tute "culpable" negligence. The court suggested that homicide by
vehicle differs from involuntary manslaughter, which requires proof
that a defendant caused death in a reckless or grossly negligent man-
ner or in a manner evidencing a conscious disregard for human life
or indifference to the consequences.
While at first glance, the Nay decision attempts to answer the
culpability question, a closer scrutiny suggests that unanswered
questions remain. The Nay decision cited an earlier Superior Court
opinion55 interpreting the current Vehicle Code that stated the fol-
lowing:
It is true that under the present involuntary manslaughter
statute a negligent operator completely escapes any criminal pun-
ishment unless the violation which precipitated death was perpe-
trated "in a reckless or grossly negligent manner." We suggest
that the legislature intended to fill this void not by punishing every
death causing violation, but rather only intended to reach those
that different from last year's model." Id. at 56. In Commonwealth v. Grace, 15 Pa. D.&C. 3d
379 (C.P. Dela. County 1979), afl'd, - Pa. Super. Ct. - - A.2d - (1980), the court ruled
that the offense of homicide by vehicle does not supersede or preempt the offense of involun-
tary manslaughter.
50. The previous availability of involuntary manslaughter to prosecute reckless or crimi-
nally negligent drivers indicates that the legislature intended to define a new offense penalizing
a lesser culpability. Commonwealth v. Beams, 10 Pa. D.&C. 3d 616 (C.P. Adams County
1978).
The punishment of ordinary negligence by penal sanctions has received severe criticism.
Critics note that the fundamental concept of criminal law requires mens rea, which includes
some degree of awareness. Eg., Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Hall,
Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1963);
Comment, The Fallacy and Fortuity of Motor Vehicle Homicide, 41 NEB. L. REV. 793 (1962). A
crime based upon mere negligence, however, is fortuitous since liability arises out of the
chance that the inadvertant driver is involved in a fatal accident. Id Furthermore, criminal
liability for ordinary negligence does not promote any theory of criminal punishment. Com-
ment, Is Criminal Negligence a Defensible Basis/or Penal Liability, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 749,
751 (1967).
51. See Commonwealth v. Nay, - Pa. Super Ct. - 421 A.2d 1231 (1980); Common-
wealth v. Barone, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 419 A.2d 457 (1980); Commonwealth v. Danchision, -
Pa. Super. Ct. - 410 A.2d 1274 (1979).
52. Commonwealth v. Nay, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 421 A.2d 1231 (1980).
53. - Pa. _ 417 A.2d 160 (1980).
54. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 421 A.2d 1231 (1980). In the Nay decision, the Superior Court
considered whether an acquittal of involuntary manslaughter would prevent a conviction of
homicide by vehicle. The court ruled that it would not. See also Commonwealth v. Koch, 67
Lanc. L. Rep. 145 (Pa. C.P. 1980).
55. Commonwealth v. Barone, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 419 A.2d 457 (1980).
violations in which there has been a 'gross deviation "from the re-
quired standard of care. There was a need for a new offense gov-
erning deaths resulting from negligent violations of the rules of
the road. This is that measure and we would so hold.56
This quote clearly suggests that only "gross deviation" from the stan-
dard of care will result in a conviction. The standard is, therefore,
identical to gross negligence.
The courts have always recognized a distinction between civil
negligence and culpable criminal negligence.57 That distinction,
however, has been lost in an attempt to save the homicide by vehicle
section from constitutional attack. If the court is indicating that
proof of civil or ordinary negligence in a violation of the motor vehi-
cle code is all that is required for a conviction, then a radical depar-
ture from current criminal law has occurred. If, however, the court
is relying upon the negligence provisions of the Crimes Code, then
the standard of culpability is the same as the degree required to con-
vict under the involuntary manslaughter provision. Civil or ordi-
nary negligence has never been sufficient to convict in such cases.i
Certainly, clarification of the degree of culpability required for
conviction is basic to any attempt to understand and evaluate the
constitutional validity of the section.59
C Equal Protection
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality
of this statute from the standpoint of the Equal Protection Clause,6"
several lower courts have considered and rejected the issue.6
It has been argued that the section is unconstitutional since the
action of a violator of the Vehicle Code or traffic ordinance may be
identical in two instances but only one of the violators is punished
depending upon whether death results. This argument has been re-
jected on the basis that the difference in treatment has a rational
56. Id at _ 419 A.2d at 465 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Busier, 445 Pa. 359, 284 A.2d 783 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Trainor, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 381 A.2d 944 (1977).
58. In Commonwealth v. Gilliland, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 422 A.2d 207 (1980), the Superior
Court noted that "[although the appellant's failure to observe the George vehicle in sufficient
time to avoid the collision is clearly a deviation from the standard of reasonable care, it does
not rise to the level of gross negligence necessary to sustain a criminal conviction." Id at
422 A.2d at 207 (1980).
59. Judge Hoffman, who concurred in the Superior Court opinion in Commonwealth v.
Nay, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 421 A.2d 1231 (1980) stated the following: "I join in the court's
opinion and wish to add that although we are bound by our Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Field, it is hoped that our Supreme Court will reconsider the issues raised in
that case and clarify this difficult area of the law." Id (Hoffman, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
60. In Commonwealth v. Field, - Pa. - 417 A.2d 160 (1980), the equal protection issue
was not pursued although it was originally raised.
61. Eg., Commonwealth v. Beams, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 616 (C.P. Adams County 1978);
Commonwealth v. Sloat, 92 York L. Rep. 180 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
basis62 and that the result of an action is the basis for most criminal
sanctions.63
A more difficult issue exists if the statute is construed to require
proof of only simple or ordinary negligence in the violation of a traf-
fic law or ordinance. The Commonwealth would, in effect, be pre-
scribing a different standard depending upon whether the defendant
was a motorist or a nonmotorist.M In order for a nonmotorist to be
guilty of a first degree misdemeanor when his actions cause death,
the person would have to be guilty of reckless or grossly negligent
conduct. A motorist, however, could be guilty of a first degree
misdemeanor if he acted negligently in the violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code or a traffic ordinance provision. If the statute is inter-
preted to require no culpable conduct the equal protection argument
becomes even more troublesome for the same reasons.
. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In several cases,6 5 the defendants have argued that the penalties
prescribed are cruel and unusual and overly harsh. This argument
actually depends upon the degree of culpability that is required for
conviction. If the same degree of culpability is required as is re-
quired for involuntary manslaughter, then the punishment, being the
same, is certainly not cruel or unusual. If, however, no degree of
culpability is required or if simple negligence becomes the standard
of culpability, then the punishment prescribed seems unusually
harsh."
When the lower courts have separately considered the cruel and
unusual punishment issue, the courts have upheld the legislature's
power to establish the penalty for this crime" or noted the court's
power to temper the punishment at the time of sentencing.68 In do-
ing so, they have refused to declare the statute unconstitutional.
IV. Causation Issue
The homicide by vehicle section is silent with regards to the de-
gree of causation that is required in order to support a conviction.69
62. Commonwealth v. Sloat, 92 York L. Rep. 180 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
63. Commonwealth v. Beams, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 616 (C.P. Adams County 1978).
64. Although this argument was not raised, one lower court discussed and rejected this
difficult issue. Commonwealth v. Beams, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 616 (C.P. Adams County 1978).
65. Eg., Commonwealth v. Beams, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 616 (C.P. Adams County 1978);
Commonwealth v. Kishbaugh, II Pa. D. & C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979); Common-
wealth v. Sloat, 92 York L. Rep. 180 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
66. Commonwealth v. Barone, - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 419 A.2d 457, 479 (1980) (Spaeth, J.,
concurring).
67. Commonwealth v. Kishbaugh, I I Pa. D. & C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979);
Commonwealth v. Sloat, 92 York L. Rep. 180 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
68. Commonwealth v. Beams, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 616 (C.P. Adams County 1978).
69. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977).
It is clear, however, that causation is an essential element of the of-
fense. Although the current Uniform Vehicle Code uses proximate
cause as its test,7" the Pennsylvania version does not contain any
such reference.
Traditionally, Pennsylvania has not employed proximate cause
in criminal cases. 7 In Commonwealth v. Guiliano, 72 the Superior
Court recently noted that "traditional tort concepts of proximate
cause have long since been discarded in homicide prosecutions [in-
volving manslaughter] in Pennsylvania in favor of the more stringent
test of direct or legal cause."7 3 Several recent decisions illustrate the
problems the courts have encountered in determining the degree of
causation necessary for a homicide by vehicle conviction.
In Commonwealth v. Gibson,74 the Dauphin County Court was
required to define the type of causation required to support a convic-
tion for homicide by vehicle. In Gibson, the defendant operated a
motor vehicle while under suspension. He struck a child on a motor
bike resulting in the death of the child. No evidence of negligent
driving on the part of defendant was produced. The defendant
failed to stop at the scene and was eventually charged with homicide
by vehicle, "hit and run" and driving under suspension.
The court recognized the lack of a standard guideline for deter-
mining when causal connection is sufficiently direct to warrant crim-
inal liability. The court concluded that the Commonwealth was
obligated to prove that the death occurred as a "probable conse-
quence" of the defendant's driving the automobile while he was
under suspension.75 The court ruled that the Commonwealth failed
to do this and the defendant was found not guilty of homicide by
vehicle.
In defining the degree of causation necessary to convict, the
70. Uniform Vehicle Code § il-903a.
71. Pennsylvania has traditionally required direct cause in vehicle cases. The direct
cause or "but for" test is found in the Crimes Code, which provides that "[c]onduct is the cause
of a result when: it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have
occurred." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 303(a)(1) (Purdon 1973). Under the direct cause test, a
defendant's act in violating a traffic law is not the direct cause of a death unless the death
would not have occurred but for that violation. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF PA. COURTS AND PA.
COLLEGE OF THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE DRAFT OF PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -
CRIMINAL, § 17-3732 (July 29, 1977). If the evidence indicates that the death would have
occurred regardless of his violation, a not guilty verdict must be returned. See Commonwealth
v. Costello, 61 Wash. R. 70, (Pa. C.P. 1980). Furthermore, if an intervening act by the victim
or a third party contributes to the death to such an extent that the defendant's act is not the
direct cause, sufficient causation will not exist for conviction. Id
72. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 418 A.2d 476 (1980).
73. Id, at - 418 A.2d at 476. See Commonwealth v. Kishbaugh, II Pa. D, & C.3d 146
(C.P. Lehigh County 1979) ("direct" causation standard used).
74. 102 Dauph. Rep. 109 (Pa. C.P. 1980).
75. Id In Commonwealth v. Field, - Pa. _ 417 A.2d 160 (1980), the Supreme Court
stated that, at the very least, the death must be a "probable consequence" of the defendant's
culpable conduct. This standard is applicable to absolute liability cases. See 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 303(d) (Purdon 1973).
court relied upon section 303(d) of the Crimes Code, which provides:
"When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense
for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not
established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the
conduct of the actor."76 If, however, homicide by vehicle does not
impose absolute liability, then the section cited by the court was im-
proper."'
In Commonwealth v. Costello," the Washington County Court
of Common Pleas granted a defendant's Motion in Arrest of Judg-
ment after a jury conviction for homicide by vehicle. The court
ruled that even if the jury concluded that the defendant was speed-
ing79 when he struck a pedestrian, it was impossible to conclude that
the defendant's speed caused the victim's death. The court suggested
that the Commonwealth had failed to prove that the result would
have been any different if the defendant had not been speeding.
The first appellate attempt to clarify the causation issue resulted
from the death of a police officer who was engaged in a high speed
pursuit of the defendant.8" The lower court had granted defendant's
motion quashing the information but the Superior Court reversed.
The Superior Court noted that the theory of proximate causation is
"unacceptable to our notions of criminal justice because it is
grounded in an expansive concept of foreseeability. '
In determining whether sufficient direct causation existed to
convict, however, the Superior Court utilized the forseeability con-
cept it had suggested was inapplicable. The Court stated:
Having observed Lang speeding, Officer Redding was duty-bound
to pursue him, which duty arguably became more compelling with
each Vehicle Code violation. In a sense, Officer Redding was
bound as if by a chain to Lang's vehicle; and, at the speed Lang
was travelling, it was forseeable that the chain would break, hur-
dling Officer Redding to his death. Lang knew or should have
known that his actions, speeding and attempting to elude arrest,
were likely to result in injury to someone: either to himself, to
some innocent third party, or to the pursuing police officer. From
the information and additional facts, it would appear that a jury
could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Lang's conduct directly resulted in Officer Redding's death and
was not a fortuitous or coincidental event unrelated to the direct
result of his conduct.
82
76. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 303(d) (Purdon 1973).
77. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 303(a) (Purdon 1973), See also Commonwealth v.
Kishbaugh, II Pa. D. & C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979).
78. 61 Wash. R. 70 (Pa. C.P. 1980).
79. The court also concluded that speeding alone could not support the charge of reckless
driving, which had been the basis for the homicide by vehicle charge.
80. Commonwealth v. Lang, -_ Pa. Super. Ct. - 426 A.2d 691 (1980).
81. Id., at . 426 A.2d at 695.
82. Id., at 426 A.2d at 695-96.
These cases suggest that the courts will be requiring the Com-
monwealth to prove a more direct causation than is required in a
civil case. The difficulty in applying the "direct" causation standard,
however, will certainly continue.
Although the Commonwealth must prove that a violation of the
vehicle code or traffic ordinance caused the death,83 the specific sec-
tion violated need not be cited or charged in the complaint. The
Superior Court, in Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 84 rejected a lower
court's conclusion that a charge of homicide by vehicle may be pros-
ecuted only if a second, supporting charge is filed. The court con-
cluded that if the Commonwealth gives the defendant adequate
notice of the particular vehicle code or traffic ordinance allegedly
violated, the Commonwealth is not required to file a separate charge
for such violation.
V. Conclusion
The homicide by vehicle section has caused numerous court de-
cisions since its enactment. Those decisions, often written without
guidance of our appellate courts, suggest the necessity of a definitive
Supreme Court ruling.
The first attempt at a definitive appellate ruling resulted in the
exact opposite. The Superior Court, in Commonwealth v. Barone, 
85
wrote three separate opinions without any of the opinions receiving
majority support. The Superior Court decision constituted little
value as a precedent. The various opinions reflected the sharp divi-
sion of thinking in regard to the constitutional issues.
The Supreme Court also had an opportunity to consider the
meaning of the section.86 It held that the section was not vague and
suggested that death caused by a violation of the Motor Vehicle
Code or a traffic ordinance would result in a conviction.
The Court, however, subsequently had to decide whether that
interpretation violated due process. The Supreme Court ruled that
some degree of culpability is required to avoid violating the due pro-
cess clause. By rewriting the statute to require culpability, the
Supreme Court has attempted to correct a faulty statute. In doing
so, it has created more problems than it has solved. Left unanswered
are the questions concerning the degree of culpability required, the
relationship of homicide by vehicle to involuntary manslaughter,
and the degree of causation required for conviction.87
83. Commonwealth v. Smith, 66 Del. Rep. 570 (Pa. C.P. 1979) (failure to prove more
than an accident requires a not guilty verdict).
84. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 420 A.2d 647 (1980).
85. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 419 A.2d 457 (1980).
86. Commonwealth v. Burt, - Pa. _ 415 A.2d 89 (1980).
87. Numerous other issues remain to be resolved. The current status of the law makes it
The courts' problems with this section are a direct result of the
inadequacies of the legislation. The section was never debated by
the legislature and its meaning was left entirely for the courts to de-
cide. The legislature should review this section and clarify its inten-
tions. The task of defining the degree of culpability required for
conviction is better left to the legislature. The courts' attempts to
salvage this section from constitutional attack will result in further
confusion and unwarranted usurpation of the duties of the legisla-
ture. If the legislature intends punishment without any criminal cul-
pability, then the courts should declare the statute unconstitutional.
If culpability is required, the legislature should define the degree.
almost impossible for a lower court to instruct a jury properly on the charge of homicide by
vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Seruscak, 101 Dauph. Rep. 50 (Pa. C.P. 1979). Common-
wealth v. Shinn, 67 Del. L.R. 739 (Pa. C.P. 1980). The difference between homicide by vehicle
and involuntary manslaughter is particularly difficult to explain. See Commonwealth v. Nay,
- Pa. Super. Ct. - 421 A.2d 1231 (1980).
The relationship of the homicide by vehicle charge to the underlying traffic violation will
continue to cause problems. See Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, - Pa. Super. Ct. _, 420 A.2d
647 (1980). Double jeopardy and merger arguments also remain to be resolved. See Com-
monwealth v. Pounds, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 421 A.2d 1126 (1980); Commonwealth v.
Spurgeon, 107 Mont. L.R. 297 (Pa. C.P. 1980). See also Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa.
622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974).
The possibility also exists that a judge could acquit a defendant of the underlying sum-
mary charge but a jury could convict him of the homicide by vehicle charge. A juvenile, who
normally can not be adjudged delinquent for a summary violation, may find himself subjected
to a delinquency hearing if death results from a summary traffic violation. Cf. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Purdon Supp. 1979).

